CASE COMMENTARIES
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Under Tennessee law, the Allen test is the proper test to be used in
order to determine whether the corporate veil may be pierced and
trial courts are required, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, to state
their findings of fact and conclusions of law for proper application
of the Allen factors in piercing the corporate veil. F & M Mktg.
Servs., Inc. v. Christenberry Trucking & Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 6122872, 2015
Tenn. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2015).
By Rebecca Loveday
In 2005, F&M Marketing Services (“F&M”) was awarded a
judgment against Christenberry Trucking & Farm, Inc. (“Christenberry”)
for approximately $375,000; however, at the time of the ruling,
Christenberry had no assets and could not satisfy the judgment. F&M
filed suit against Christenberry to pierce the corporate veil and hold its
primary shareholder, Clayton Christenberry, Jr., personally liable.
At trial, the court orally ruled in favor of Appellees, refused to
prepare a Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law, failed to find and apply
the proper law in regard to piercing the corporate veil, and asked each
party to prepare a Finding of Fact, which the judge then entered on his
own.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals determined: 1)
whether the trial court made sufficient findings of fact and conclusions
of law that were a product of its independent judgment; (2) whether the
court erred in its determination of the appropriate test used to pierce the
corporate veil; and (3) whether the court’s findings of fact were adequate
for application under the Allen factors.
First, the court held that the trial court failed to comply with
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, which states that courts “shall find the facts
specifically and state separately its conclusions of law and direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment.” Prior to July 1, 2009, courts were
required to make these specific findings only if requested by a party and
before a judgment was entered. The current law requires courts to make
such findings, even absent a party’s request. Furthermore, “the absence
of findings and conclusions . . . leaves the parties without the thing they
most need: a decision.” Because Findings of Fact are mandatory and
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“not a mere technicality,” the trial court was “categorically incorrect” in
its omission.1
Second, the court held that the trial court erred in its
determination of the appropriate test used to pierce the corporate veil.
In doing so, the court looked to three tests that the trial court applied: 1)
the Continental Bankers test; 2) the Barbour test; and 3) the Allen test. The
court reasoned that the Continental Bankers test was wrongly used because
the test typically involves a parent-subsidiary relationship, which was
absent from the case at hand. Also, the Barbour test was wrongly used
because the trial court applied a “sham or dummy corporation test,”
when no such test existed. Thus, the court held that the trial court
should have used the Allen test, as indicated by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in the seminal case of Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196
(Tenn. 2012).
Third, the court determined whether the adopted Findings of
Fact were satisfactory under the Allen test. The Allen test requires courts
to determine whether the entity to be pierced has been used for fraud or
injustice, followed by a non-exhaustive list of eleven factors to be
considered. The court further stated that:
“[Although] there is no bright-line
test by which to assess the sufficiency of
the trial court's factual findings, the
general rule is that the findings of fact
must include as much of the subsidiary
facts as is necessary to disclose to the
reviewing court the steps by which the
trial court reached its ultimate conclusion
on each factual issue.”
Here, the court determined that the trial court, once again, fell
short of what was required of it because it could not be determined
which factors the trial court applied, considered, or weighed. Because “it
is impossible to decipher upon which factors [and facts] the trial court
based its decision,” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 required the court to vacate
the judgment and remand it to the trial court.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals also noted that it was wrong for the trial court to
ask the parties to prepare and submit a Finding of Fact because Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01
requires a court’s decision to be “the result of the exercise of the trial court’s own
judgment.”
1
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In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee
should ensure that trial courts explicitly include Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in the record, prepared by the judge, as required by
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, which was revised in order to better facilitate
appellate review. Further, courts should note that the proper test, unless
otherwise provided, to use in determining whether a plaintiff may pierce
the corporate veil is the Allen test, which requires a court to determine
whether an entity was used for fraud or injustice, followed by a weighing
of eleven non-exhaustive factors.

CONTRACTS/INSURANCE
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that: (1) insurance
settlement agreements are to be construed in context; (2) the
issuance of a two-party check does not, by itself, divest either party
of its interest in the check; and (3) lenders who issue mortgages
maintain a separate interest in settlement proceeds resulting from
property damages, distinct from the lenders’ interest in the
borrower’s debt. Dawood v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 15-1242, 2015
WL 5637548, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17037 (6th Cir. Sep. 25, 2015).
By Samuel Ferguson
In Dawood v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed three issues: (1) whether courts may look to context
surrounding insurance settlement agreements in order to construe
ambiguous terms; (2) whether a change of a settlement proceeds check
from a single-party check to a two-party check divests the initial
recipient of its interest in the settlement proceeds; and (3) whether
lenders who issue mortgages maintain an ongoing interest in settlement
proceeds resulting from property damages, distinct from the lenders’
interest in the borrower’s debt.
Rafah Dawood (“Plaintiff”) purchased a home insurance policy
(the “Policy”) through Farmer’s Insurance (“Farmers”), which covered
losses against fire damage and named JP Morgan Chase (“Defendant”)
as the payee. On December 30, 2010, Plaintiff’s home burned down. At
that time, the home was encumbered with two mortgages and a lien of
which the Defendant owned the interests. After the fire, Defendant
discharged the second mortgage and the home was sold as a foreclosure.
Defendant also discharged the remainder of the first mortgage.

390 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17

A few years later, Plaintiff and Farmers entered into a joint
stipulation in which Farmers agreed to pay Plaintiff an immediate
$175,000 for personal property losses “in exchange for [Plaintiff’s]
release and discharge of Farmers [from] any and all future liability claims
and demands.” The stipulation further indicated that Farmers “would
pay either a negotiated settlement amount, or up to the full amount, of
the lien on the property held by [Defendant] . . . .”
Farmers later negotiated a settlement with Defendant and issued
a check naming Defendant as the only recipient. Upon learning that
Plaintiff intended to assert rights to the funds, Farmers cancelled the
initial check and issued a two-party check to both Plaintiff and
Defendant. Plaintiff filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court, seeking a
declaratory judgment in order to establish the owner of the proceeds.
Defendant removed the case to federal district court and moved to
dismiss on grounds that Plaintiff had waived her right to the proceeds
from the two-party check when Plaintiff entered into the joint
stipulation and because the home insurance policy named Defendant as
the payee. The district court granted the motion, holding that Defendant
had standing to bring suit and successfully assert that it was entitled to
collect the entirety of the settlement funds.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings
after addressing three issues: (1) whether the joint stipulation was
ambiguous as to which party would receive the settlement proceeds,
once the negotiated settlement amount had been determined; (2)
whether Defendant was divested of its standing as a third-party
beneficiary of the joint stipulation between Plaintiff and Farmers; and (3)
whether Defendant divested itself of any interest in the insurance
proceeds by discharging Plaintiff’s mortgages.
First, the court applied its previous decision in Perry v. Sied, 611
N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. 2000), noting that although the joint stipulation
did not expressly identify to whom the insurance proceeds must be paid,
“the terms of an agreement . . . are to be construed in context.” The
court read the terms of the joint stipulation and the insurance policy,
reasoning that – when read together – they clearly prevent Plaintiff from
recovering any amount above $175,000 for personal property loss. The
home insurance policy named Defendant as the payee and the joint
stipulation stated that Farmers would pay the lien holder – here, the
Defendant – a negotiated amount. Thus, the court held that the terms of
the joint stipulation and insurance policy were clear as to whom the
intended recipient was and that Defendant was the intended third-party
beneficiary to the joint stipulation.
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Second, the court held that Farmers’ issuance of a two-party
check was insufficient to show that Farmers intended to divest
Defendant of its standing as a third-party beneficiary to the joint
stipulation. The court found that Farmers issued the check to both
parties only to avoid subsequent litigation, depending on the outcome of
the litigation, and not to divest Defendant of its interest in the proceeds.
Third, the court held that Defendant’s discharge of Plaintiff’s
mortgages did not divest its interest in the settlement proceeds. The
court reasoned that when the the house burned down, the lender’s rights
were triggered, automatically giving Defendant an interest in the
proceeds as it was the named payee of the policy, even though
Defendant discharged the debts before receipt of the proceeds. Further,
Defendant’s interest in the insurance proceeds, pursuant to the mortgage
agreement, was separate from its interest in Plaintiff’s debt. Thus, the
time of discharge had no impact on Defendant’s interest.
In light of Dawood, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal’s approach
to contract interpretation remains consistent with general principles of
contract law. The Sixth Circuit construes the terms of an agreement
based on the context as well as the plain language of the agreement.
Lawyers who practice in the Sixth Circuit can avoid a Dawood situation
by specifically naming intended beneficiaries, as well as by stating the
reasons for which a two-party check may be issued. Further, because
lienholders maintain distinct interests in borrowers’ debt – and possibly
insurance settlement proceeds – practitioners should note that an
interest is not divested merely by discharging debt before the receipt of
the proceeds; and a borrower has no standing to recover insurance
proceeds if his or her debt is discharged before the the payment of the
insurance proceeds.
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COPYRIGHT
The Sixth Circuit held that a registration certificate issued by the
U.S. Copyright Office is a presumption of a valid copyright, and
also adopted a hybrid version of the design-process test in order to
determine whether a design is separable from a useful article and
its utilitarian features. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799
F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015).
By Michael Ransom
In Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether “pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural features,” that are incorporated into “the design of a useful
article,” can be identified separately from, and exist independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article, making those features copyrightable.
Varsity Brands, Inc. (“Varsity”) designs and manufactures
apparel and accessories for cheerleading and other athletic activities, and
it also owns registered copyrights for multiple design elements. Star
Athletica, LLC, (“Star”) also sells athletic gear for cheerleading and is a
competitor of Varsity. After coming across Star’s marketing materials,
Varsity sued Star for copyright infringement, claiming that Star was
marketing cheerleading uniforms with elements that were similar to five
of its registered designs.1 Varsity also brought suit under Tennessee law
for: 1) unfair competition; 2) inducement of breach of contract; 3)
inducement of breach of fiduciary duty; and 4) civil conspiracy.2
After discovery ended, both parties filed motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in Star’s favor
for the copyright claims, finding:
Varsity’s designs were not copyrightable
because the graphic elements of Varsity’s
designs are not physically or conceptually
separable from the utilitarian function of
a cheerleading uniform because the
colors, stripes, chevrons, and similar
Varsity had previously registered five copyrights with the United States Copyright
Office for two-dimensional designs that it used on cheerleading uniforms, including
chevrons, lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted chevrons, colorings, and
shapes.
1

2

Star also filed counter claims, which are not discussed here.
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designs typically associated with sports in
general, and cheerleading in particular
make the garment they appear on
recognizable as a cheerleading uniform.
In light of these findings, the district court held that “the aesthetic
features of a cheerleading uniform merge with the functional purpose of
the uniform.” 3 With no remaining federal claim, the district court
refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed Varsity’s case
including the state law claims.
Under Sixth Circuit law, in order to prove copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must show that: 1) it owned a valid copyright in
the designs; and 2) the defendant copied protectable elements of the
work. The first prong of the test is used to determine the originality and
non-functionality of the work, and courts look to the following five
elements to establish the validity of a copyright:
1) the originality in the author; 2) the
copyrightability of the subject matter; 3) a
national point of attachment of the work,
such as to permit a claim of copyright; 4)
compliance with applicable statutory
formalities; and 5) (if the plaintiff is not
an author) a transfer of rights or other
relationship between the author and the
plaintiff so as to constitute the plaintiff as
the valid copyright claimant.
The second prong is used to determine whether a valid copyright was
copied and whether the portions copied were entitled to legal protection.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the
only issue before it was whether the subject matter of Varsity’s designs
was copyrightable and therefore a valid copyright under the first prong
of the test. The court then addressed Varsity’s arguments which asserted
that: 1) the district court did not afford appropriate deference to the
Copyright Office’s determination of copyrightability; 2) the district court
used the wrong approach to determine whether a design is copyrightable
subject matter that is separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article;
3

The district court did not address the originality of Varsity’s designs.
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and 3) its designs are copyrightable as a matter of law because they are
graphic works and not useful articles.
First, the court noted that Varsity successfully registered five
designs with the Copyright Office; and a certificate of registration
“constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright . . . .” 4
When a plaintiff introduces evidence that the work at issue was
registered, the burden shifts to the defendant in order to prove that the
plaintiff’s copyrights are invalid. In determining how much evidentiary
weight to accord to the Copyright Office’s determination, the court held
that a registered design protectable under the Copyright Act is entitled to
Skidmore deference. The court found that Skidmore deference was
appropriate because the Copyright Office: 1) has experience identifying
useful articles and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 2) publishes
an internal manual that instructs employees how to apply the provisions
of the Copyright Act; 3) consistently applied the same interpretation of
separability to Varisty’s registrations; 4) consistently found Varisty’s
registrations to be original and separable from the utilitarian aspects of
the cheerleading uniforms; 5) used sound legal reasoning; and 6) is an
expert agency in identifying the difference between art and function. 5
The court held that the district court did not give Varsity’s registration
Skidmore deference and thus failed to appropriately defer to the
Copyright Office’s determination. As a result, the burden to rebut the
presumption of validity shifted to Star.
This shift raised the second issue; namely, whether Star could
rebut Varsity’s presumption of validity. In order to determine whether
Varsity’s registrations were protectable, the court must determine:
1) whether the design for which the
author seeks copyright protection is a
design of a useful article; and 2)
whether the design of the useful
article incorporates pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspect of the useful
article.
4

17 U.S.C. §410(c) (1976).

The court also looked to what its sister courts did and decided to fall in-line with the
Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
5
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The court declined to be the first circuit to split in its
interpretation of separability, recognized both the physical separability6
and conceptual separability test 7 , and held that the Copyright Act
protects two-dimensional works “of a design of a useful article even if
those features cannot be removed physically from the useful article, as
long as they are conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
article.”
The court looked to other circuits for clarification on the design
process approach, which determines whether a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work is conceptually separable. After reviewing the approach
taken by other circuits, the court adopted its own version of the design
process approach. Under the Sixth Circuit’s design process test, courts
should ask a series of questions in order to determine whether a twodimensional work is conceptually separable from its utilitarian features.
First, is the design a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work? If yes, is it a
design of a useful article?8 If yes, what are the utilitarian aspects of the
useful article?9 Can the viewer of the design identify pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features separately from the utilitarian aspects of the useful
article? If so, can the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the
design of the useful article exist “independently of the utilitarian aspects
of the [useful] article?” If any of the questions are answered negatively,
then the utilitarian design is not copyrightable.
In this case, the court determined that the answers to all five
questions were affirmative. First, the copyright registrations that Varsity
received were for two-dimensional works of graphic art. Second,
Varsity’s designs were sketches of cheerleading uniforms that did not
merely portray clothing or information. Third, the utilitarian aspects of
the cheerleading uniforms are to cover the body, absorb moisture, and
When a useful article contains two-dimensional figures that can be physically
separated from it while leaving the useful article intact.
6

When a feature of the useful article is clearly recognizable as a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work, notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be physically separated from
the article by ordinary means.
7

An article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information. If the design is not the design of a
useful article, then there is no need to inquire into whether there are pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article.
8

9

See 17 U.S.C. §101 (2010) (defining “useful article”).
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withstand cheerleading movements. Fourth, graphic features of Varsity’s
designs and arrangements could be identified separately from the parts
of the uniform covering the body and performing other utilitarian
functions. Fifth, the designs may exist independently of the useful article
because Varsity can transfer the designs from the uniform to other
articles and may be incorporated onto a number of different uniforms.
Thus, the court affirmatively answered all of the questions and held that
Varsity’s designs were copyrightable subject matter because they “can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uniforms.”
In Varsity, the Sixth Circuit clarified its views on what falls under
the subject matter of copyrightability. Transactional attorneys in the
Sixth Circuit should know that the court adopted a Skidmore level of
deference with regard to copyrights registered by the Copyright Office.
This means that a registration certificate from the Copyright Office is
considered a presumption of a valid copyright, which shifts the burden
to the opposing party to rebut the presumption’s validity. Furthermore,
the Sixth Circuit adopted its own hybrid version of the design-process
test, which is used to determine whether the designs in question are
separable from the useful article and the useful article’s utilitarian
aspects.

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Under Tennessee law, it is wrongful to discharge a public
employee for engaging in conduct protected by the Tennessee
Public Protection Act, regardless of a chain-of-command policy.
Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96 (Tenn. 2015).
By FolaSade Omogun
In Williams v. City of Burns, the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed whether terminating a public employee for whistleblowing,
when the employer had a separate process for reporting illegal activity
and the employee did not follow it, is a non-retaliatory reason to fire an
employee.
In 2008, Captain Larry Williams (“Willliams”) drafted a new
traffic citation policy for Chief Jerry Sumerour (the “Chief”).1 The Police
Department of the City of Burns (the “Department”) approved and set
1

The City of Burns represented Chief.
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into effect the new policy, which stated: “once an officer in the field
issues a traffic citation, the issuing officer is not permitted to cancel the
ticket or convert it into a warning.”
After the policy went into effect, Williams stopped a speeding
driver, who turned out to be the Chief’s stepson. Williams issued the
Chief’s stepson two speeding tickets. Later that evening, Chief asked
Williams to stop by Chief's home and to bring the traffic citations with
him. While there, Chief asked Williams to write "warning" on the traffic
tickets and give them to Chief. Williams initially refused because he did
not want to violate the new traffic policy, but eventually did what Chief
asked him to do.
The next morning, Williams met with the Mayor of Burns, Jeff
Bishop (“Mayor”), at the Department and informed him of what
happened; Chief also discussed the situation with Mayor and an attorney.
Based on the conversation, Chief issued the tickets as warnings, “wrote
up” Williams for discussing the situation with Mayor, because Mayor
was outside of the chain of command, and threatened to fire Williams.
Williams met with Mayor again and informed him that Chief was trying
to fire him.
Mayor eventually called Chief and told him that the tickets
should not be issued as warnings and scheduled a meeting with him. At
the meeting, Mayor told Chief that Williams was trying to have him fired
and that Williams discussed the situation with three other officers in the
Department. Chief obtained written statements from the three officers
and terminated Williams employment on April 9, 2008. Williams was
terminated for “insubordination by violating the Department’s chain-ofcommand rules and by undermining Chief’s authority with the other
police officers.”
On May 2, 2008, Williams filed suit in the Circuit Court for
Dickerson County against the City of Burns, asserting a claim of
retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act
(“TPPA”)2. Williams claimed that he was terminated solely because he
refused to remain silent about Chief’s violation of the traffic policy. The
court granted summary judgment for the City of Burns (the “City”),
reasoning that Williams failed to establish that City discharged him solely
for refusing to participate in the matter. On appeal, the court reversed,
holding that there were genuine issues of material fact in regard to:
2

TENN. CODE ANN. §50-1-304 (2000).
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1) whether Williams refused to participate in or remain silent about the
ticket fixing; and 2) whether Williams failed to prove the actual
motivation behind his discharge.
On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of City, reasoning that
although Williams may have been discharged for refusing to participate
in the ticket fixing plan, he was also terminated for violating the
Department’s rules by not following the chain-of-command; thus,
Williams was not terminated solely for refusing to participate in the
ticket fixing plan. On appeal, the court reversed and held in favor of
Williams. The court reasoned that it was against the intent of the TPPA
to require Williams to report illegal activity to the wrongdoer, and that
Williams’ disclosure to Mayor was protected under TPPA. Further, the
court found that Chief’s motivations to terminate Williams were not
based on insubordination, and that there existed a pretext for retaliation.
Under Tennessee law, courts employ the doctrine of
employment at will, which states that an employee may be fired at any
time, with or without a reason; however, Tennessee recognizes the
common law exception of retaliatory discharge, where an employee is
fired for taking action that public policy encourages. 3 The TPPA
codified Tennessee’s retaliatory discharge exception as follows: (1) the
plaintiff was an employee of the defendant; (2) the plaintiff refused to
participate in or remain silent about illegal activity; (3) the defendant
employer discharged or terminated the plaintiff’s employment; and (4)
the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment solely for the
plaintiff’s refusal to participate in or remain silent about the illegal
activity.4 At the outset of the case, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted
that only the second and fourth prong of the test were at issue; however,
the trial court failed to apply the Burdine5 burden-shifting analysis to the
parties’ proof when analyzing the the prongs of the statute. Under
Burdine, if a plaintiff proves a prima facie case of retaliation, a rebuttable
presumption is created as to the defendant. If the defendant rebuts the
presumption then the presumption of retaliation would have dropped
from the case, resulting in the factfinder having to decide whether the
termination was retaliatory. However, a plaintiff “must . . . have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

Tennessee’s common law retaliatory discharge exception only applies to private
employees; however, the TPPA also extends to public employees.
3

4

See TENN. CODE ANN. §50-1-304 (2000).

5

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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legitimate reasons offered by [the defendant] were not [his] true reasons,
but were a pretext for [retaliation].”
Under Burdine, a plaintiff who asserts a claim under the TPPA
establishes a prima facie case of retaliatory discharges by showing: 1) the
plaintiff engaged in conduct protected by the TPPA; 2) the protected
conduct was known to the defendant; 3) the defendant thereafter
discharged the plaintiff; and 4) there was a causal connection between
the protected conduct and the discharge. The court found that Williams
satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case because: 1) he
refused to remain silent about the ticket fixing; 2) the Chief knew about
the conduct; 3) Williams was thereafter discharged; and 4) he was
discharged because he refused to remain silent about the ticket fixing.
Thereafter, Williams created a rebuttable presumption that Chief
unlawfully retaliated against him solely because Williams refused to
remain silent.
In order to rebut a prima facie case, the defendant need “only
introduce admissible evidence showing that unlawful retaliation was not
the sole cause of [termination].” At trial, Chief introduced evidence that
Williams was fired for going above the chain of command, not because
of Williams’ conduct. Thus, Chief shifted the burden back to Williams at
trial.
The court then looked to whether Chief’s burden-shifting was
mere pretext. Pretext can be shown by establishing: 1) the employer’s
proffered reasons had no basis in fact; 2) that the proffered reasons did
not actually motivate the discharge; or 3) that the reasons were
insufficient to motivate the discharge. Whether a rebuttal is pretext
should be determined in light of all of the evidence.
The court held that Chief’s rebuttal was mere pretext because,
after the incident: 1) Chief was increasingly hostile toward Williams; 2)
Williams was subject to heightened work scrutiny and discipline; 3) the
narrow time-frame in which the protected conduct occurred and the
termination; and 4) because Williams was fired for going above the chain
of command – “to discipline an employee for going over the head of a
supervisor allegedly involved in illegal . . . workplace activity undermines
. . . the Legislature’s [intent in passing the TPPA].” Thus, the court held
that Chief effectively admitted to discharging Williams in retaliation for
going above the chain of command.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Williams refined the
Burdine test for use in retaliatory discharge claims under the TPPA.
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Although the common law exception is only available to private
employees, the TPPA expanded the exception to cover public
employees. Because of the expansion, practicing attorneys and courts
should know that the Burdine test must be used when interpreting a
retaliatory discharge claim under the TPPA. Further, the court
interpreted the TPPA’s second prong to broadly construe “refusal to
remain silent,” stating that employers need not explicitly inform
employees to remain silent in order for an employee to satisfy his burden
of proof. As a result of this, the court’s interpretation eases a plaintiff’s
claim under the TPPA and negates an employer defense: the fact that an
employer did not tell an employee to remain silent is not a defense.
Thus, employers should defend a retaliatory discharge claim under the
TPPA by showing: 1) its reasons for discharge were not retaliatory; 2) its
reasons for discharge were not pretextual; and 3) it did not discharge an
employee for engaging in conduct protected by the TPPA.

PATENT
Under Brulotte, the Supreme Court held that patent royalty
provisions are unenforceable after a patent expires, regardless of
an express agreement; however, Brulotte does not apply to nonpatent royalty provisions. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401
(2015).
By Ann Pederson
In Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, the United States Supreme
Court addressed whether its previous ruling in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379
U.S. 29 (1964) forced it to deem unenforceable a royalty provision for
patent use, where the patent had expired and the contract provided no
end date for royalty payments. Ultimately, the Court begrudgingly held
that a patentee cannot continue to receive royalties after the expiration
of a patent, regardless of a private contract to the contrary.
In 1990, Stephen Kimble (“Kimble”) patented a toy that allowed
persons to role-play as “a spider person” and shoot webs (pressurized
foam string) from the palm of their hands. In 1997, Kimble sued Marvel
Entertainment (“Marvel”) for patent infringement because Marvel
marketed a similar toy that resembled Kimble’s patent. Ultimately, the
parties settled and agreed that Marvel would purchase Kimble’s patent
and in exchange pay a three percent royalty on future sales of the toy
and similar products; however, the agreement did not set an end date for
the royalty payments.
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After the settlement agreements concluded, Marvel discovered
the Court’s ruling in Brulotte, which had interpreted the patent laws to
preclude a patentee from receiving royalties from sales made after a
patent’s expiration. Marvel thus sought a declaratory judgment in federal
district court in order to confirm that it did not have to pay royalties
after the expiration of the patent, notwithstanding the contract it entered
into with Kimble. The district court held that Brulotte made the royalty
payment provision unenforceable after the patent’s expiration; the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In 2014, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether Brulotte should be overruled because it
prevents parties from freely entering into contracts.
Although the Court agreed that the problems caused by Brulotte
unfairly impact individuals’ contractual rights in this area of patent law,
stare decisis forces it to stand by yesterday’s decision and only overturn
Brulotte if there is a “special justification” above and beyond the belief
that the case was wrongly decided. Also, the Court noted that even
though it might decide Brulotte differently today than it had previously,
“respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.”
In weighing the impact that Brulotte has on the freedom to
contract in the area of patent law, the Court determined that no special
justification exists to overturn Brulotte for the following reasons: 1)
Brulotte has been well-settled law for approximately fifty years; 2)
Congress considered multiple changes to Brulotte over the years, and
Brulotte survived each one; 3) nothing about Brulotte has proved to be
unworkable or ambiguous; 4) the Court would bring in a new round of
litigation if it were to overturn Brulotte; 5) if Brulotte were overturned, the
Court would be hesitant that enforcing the contract would push the
patent away from the public sphere of free use and back into the party’s
hands; and 6) the Court would prefer to leave the matter in Congress’
hands and not unsettle stable law.
Based on the aforementioned, the Court held that stare decisis
prevents it from overturning Brulotte and that relief must be sought from
Congress, not the courts. Brulotte is well-settled law and easy to apply; the
rule only requires a court to ask whether a licensing agreement provides
for royalty payments after a patent’s expiration. Moreover, the Court
distinguished Brulotte and clarified that the case does not apply to nonpatent royalties and that patent royalties may be received post-expiration
only if the royalties are for deferred payments from the patent’s use
during its living twenty-year period.
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In light of this decision, attorneys should know that Brulotte is the
controlling case when contracting for patent royalties and that,
regardless of express agreement, contractual provisions for royalty
payments after a patent expires are unenforceable. The fact that the
parties may not know about Brulotte at the time of of contracting has no
bearing on the Court’s analysis because the Court intended Brulotte to be
simple: if a contract calls for royalty provisions after a patent’s
expiration, that provision is unenforceable. Attorneys should negotiate
alternatives that would allow a party to receive non-royalty payments, or
other compensation, after a patent expires and moves into the public
domain.

WILLS AND ESTATES
Under Tennessee law, a child is considered born “out of wedlock,”
regardless of the mother’s marital status at the time of the child’s
birth, if the child’s biological father is not and has never been
married to the child’s mother, therefore giving the child standing
to assert a claim of inheritance against the biological father’s
estate. In re Estate of Tucker, No. E2014-02112-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL
7068134, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 901 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015).
By Cameron Kapperman
In In re Estate of Tucker, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
addressed whether, under TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2015),
a child whose mother was married at the time of the child’s birth is a
child born out of wedlock, where the child’s biological father was not
the mother’s husband – therefore giving the child standing to assert a
claim of inheritance against the biological father’s estate.
In May of 2010, Ola Irene Tucker (“Deceased”) died unmarried
and intestate. Deceased had three children, of which all three died
leaving behind children. In September of 2010, two grandchildren,
Dianna Allen (“Ms. Allen”) and Michael Bivens (“Mr. Bivens”), filed a
petition in the Probate Court for Loudon County, Tennessee. They
sought the administration of Deceased’s estate (“Estate”) and requested
their appointment as co-administrators. 1 The trial court granted their
requests and issued them Letters of Administration.

1

The petition also listed three additional living grandchildren.
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During the administration of the Estate, question arose as to
who was the father of Ms. Allen’s . Ms. Allen claimed that one of
Deceased’s sons was her biological father, even though Ms. Allen was
born while her mother was married to a different man.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
Ms. Allen was a child of Deceased’s son and therefore entitled to an
inheritance via intestate succession. The trial court held that under
Tennessee law:2 1) Ms. Allen was not born out of wedlock because her
mother was married to another man; and 2) Ms. Allen therefore lacked
standing to assert a claim of inheritance.
Under Tennessee law, for purposes of intestate succession, a
parent-child relationship must be established in order to determine
succession. A person born out of wedlock is automatically considered a
child of the mother. However, in order for the person to also be
considered a child of the father, paternity must be established by an
adjudication: 1) before the father dies; or 2) by clear and convincing
proof. Further, the father must have openly treated the child as his own
and supported the child.3
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue
of whether Ms. Allen was a child born of out wedlock and could
therefore have standing to assert a claim of inheritance. 4 The court
applied its previous holding in In re Estate of Armstrong5, noting that the
intent of the Tennessee General Assembly, when it enacted TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2015), was “to allow a child to inherit
from her biological father even if [the biological father] and the child’s
mother . . .” were not, nor have ever been married to each other at the
time of the child’s birth.
The Tucker Court emphasized that it was possible for Ms. Allen
to be a child born out of wedlock, for purposes of TENN. CODE ANN. §
31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2015), if she could establish: 1) the requisite proof
that Deceased’s son was her father; and 2) that Ms. Allen’s mother and
2

TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2015).

3

Id.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether a child whose
mother was married at the time of the child’s birth could be a child born of wedlock.
However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue in In re Armstrong, 859
S.W.2d 323, 327-28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
4

5

Id. (child born out of wedlock even though mother married to different man).
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Deceased’s son were not and had never been married at the time of Ms.
Allen’s birth – regardless of whether Ms. Allen’s mother was married to
another man. The court remanded the case back to the trial court to
determine whether Ms. Allen proved, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Deceased’s son was her biological father, therefore giving her
standing to assert a claim of inheritance.
The court’s ruling reflects its desire to: 1) follow legislative intent
that out of wedlock children be able to inherit from their biological
parents; and 2) clarify the role a mother’s status has in determining a
child’s status. In light of this decision, Tennessee attorneys should be
aware that, although the Tennessee Supreme Court has not decided this
issue, the Tennessee Court of Appeals completely disregards the
mother’s status. Generally, if a child establishes a father’s paternity by
clear and convincing evidence, the child is considered born out of
wedlock and has standing to assert a claim of inheritance against the
biological father’s estate via intestate succession.

